![]() ![]() In other words, there are more male board members with family ties to the companies than women.ĭuring the course of the reform, several of Heidenreich’s informants changed their position and became supporters of the gender quota law. “Many people thought the companies would recruit women who had family ties to the companies in order to reach the target, but it turns out that the women who have been recruited to the boards are more independent than the men," explains Heidenreich. The survey also shows that the women are seen as qualified to sit on the board by other board members. Most of the board members, men and women alike, are economists, lawyers and engineers with management experience. The women are also younger and better educated on average than the men. The Institute for Social Research has conducted a survey which shows that the new female board members are just as competent as the men. Now that the target of 40 percent women on the boards has been reached, it appears that this has not happened. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.įor technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form. ![]() It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. This allows to link your profile to this item. If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.įor technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:50:y:2017:i:c:p:460-472. You can help correct errors and omissions. 84(3), pages 566-584, June.įull references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)Īll material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. " Strategic Buyers and Exclusionary Contracts,"Īmerican Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. Innes, Robert & Sexton, Richard J, 1994." Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity,"Īmerican Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994.Segal, 2000.Īmerican Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. " Competition in Multi-sided Markets: Divide and Conquer,"Īmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. " Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer,"Ħ104, University Library of Munich, Germany. ![]() Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. " Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. " Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. " The Freedom to Contract and the Free-Rider Problem," ![]() RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. " Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003.Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991.Īmerican Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol." Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure,"ĥ48, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics. ![]()
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